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Introduction 
 
The Responsibility to Protect, or RtoP, is a principle that, since its birth in 
2001, has caused much debate internationally for what it has meant in the past, 
what it entails in the present, and what it has the potential to become in the future. 
In its thirteen years of existence, the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine has grown 
tremendously, transforming from a “gleam in a commission’s eye to what now 
may be described as a broadly accepted international norm.”1 Renowned 
professionals in the field of humanitarian assistance and protection such as Gareth 
Evans and Siobhan Wills have opted for calling RtoP a norm, without expanding 
on whether the principle is “mature and developed enough to have undergone the 
transition into a norm.”2 In fact, RtoP has a history of being described by its 
supporters as a “broadly accepted international norm with the potential to evolve 
into a full-fledged rule of customary international law.”3 However, RtoP still has 
a long trajectory ahead due to the evident hesitance by several states who continue 
to oppose it. While some of the concepts of RtoP correlate harmoniously with pre-
existing international human rights laws, others pose a drastic challenge to extant 
principles and theories under the global structure such as the deeply rooted 
ideologies of state sovereignty and non-intervention.4  
From its introduction by the International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty, to its endorsement in the Secretary General’s High Level Panel 
Report on Threats, Challenges and Change in 2004, then again in the World 
Summit Outcome Document of 2005, and more recently in the roundtable talks 
led by the Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, it is undeniable that 
RtoP has come a long way in the norm life cycle. However, the misapplication of 
the principle in the 2011 humanitarian crises in Libya, and subsequently in Syria 
has caused significant and possibly irreparable damage in its path towards 
becoming a universally accepted principle of international law.  
 
Contradicting Principles: State Sovereignty versus The Responsibility to 
Protect 
 
                                                        
1 Gareth Evans, From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect. Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 24, (2006-2007), 712. 
2
 Sabine Hassler, R2P and the protection obligations of peacekeepers, Journal of International 
Humanitarian Legal Studies 1, no. 1 (2010): 207. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 Liu Tiewa, China and responsibility to protect: Maintenance and change of its policy for 
intervention, Pacific Review 25, no. 1 (2012), 154. 
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 The Responsibility to Protect is a newly emerging concept that, as defined 
by the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, grants “each individual State the 
responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic 
cleansing and crimes against humanity.”5 When states fail to do so, the 
international community has the “responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, 
humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII 
of the Charter, to help to protect populations” from such violations.6 One of the 
focal problems with RtoP is its intrinsic contradiction with the principle of state 
sovereignty that is so deeply embedded in existing international law. In fact, state 
sovereignty is essentially the dominant foundation of international law.7 
Traditionally, as established by Chapter 1, Article 2(7) of the universally accepted 
foundational Charter of the United Nations, state sovereignty “has meant that the 
state is subject to no other state, and has full and exclusive powers within its 
jurisdiction.”8 Since its foundations in the Treaty of Westphalia of 1948, the way 
that a nation acted “towards its own citizens in its own territory was a matter of 
domestic jurisdiction...and therefore not any business for international law.”9 In 
modern times, however, a world complexly interconnected by the increasing 
forces of globalization implies the opposite: that it is both lawful and obligatory 
for “states or non-state actors to be concerned about the treatment of the 
inhabitants of another state.”10 While RtoP urges the international community to 
intervene in foreign internal catastrophes on humanitarian grounds, the language 
of the UN charter provides a contradictory statement of non-interference11 stating 
that, “[n]othing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United 
Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state.”12  
Throughout history, the non-intervention international law principle has 
enjoyed much adherence and support, especially from developing countries, due 
to the fact that after decolonization, the new—and therefore weaker—states, saw 
                                                        
5 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), The Responsibility to 
Protect, Ottawa: ICISS, 2001. 
6 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 63/677, Implementing the responsibility to protect: 
report of the Secretary-General. (A/RES/63/677), 12 January 2009, ¶138-139. 
7 David Berman and Christopher Michaelsen, Intervention in Libya: Another nail in the coffin for 
the responsibility-to-protect?, International Community Law Review 14, no. 4 (2012), 338. 
 
8
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, I UNTS XVI, 24 October 1945, 3. 
9
 Margaret E. Keck. and Kathryn Sikkink, Activists beyond borders: advocacy networks in 
international politics, (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998), 36. 
10
 Ibid. 
11
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect”, 705. 
12
 United Nations, Charter of the United Nations, 3. 
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 it as their only defense against more powerful international actors that they felt 
threatened by.13 Although reasonable, the strong sentiment toward national 
sovereignty was “extremely inhibiting to the development of any sense of 
obligation to respond in an effective way to situations of catastrophic internal 
human rights violations.”14 This global notion persisted even after the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights was issued, and seemingly, most of the world 
continued to lean towards non-intervention.  
Prior to the tragic humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s in Kosovo and 
Rwanda, most states accepted the general international law principle “that force 
could not be used inside the territory of a sovereign state unless the state at issue 
consented, the Security Council had authorized the use of force under Chapter VII 
of the UN Charter, or the use of force was in self-defense following an armed 
attack as delineated by Article 51 of the UN Charter.”15 However, in the last two 
decades, the world has made a radical shift away from traditional ideas about 
national sovereignty,16 a shift that arose from a nearly universal belief that human 
rights atrocities should not hide under the cloak of state sovereignty.17 This 
change was rooted in the RtoP-endorsed idea that by claiming sovereignty, states 
take on a responsibility to protect their citizens from suffering and that when “the 
state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of non-
intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”18 Discussions 
and debates revolving around RtoP have had a relevant impact on international 
policies, causing British historian Sir Martin Gilbert to describe it as the most 
relevant change to the principle of state sovereignty in almost 400 years.19  
 
RtoP’s Journey Through the Norm Life Cycle 
 
The Responsibility to Protect started as an idea from Secretary General 
Kofi Annan that questionably has shifted toward becoming a norm and has the 
potential to become international law in the future. As human rights academic 
Kathryn Sikkink explains, “early norm adoption is the result of domestic political 
struggle and norm entrepreneurs, but later adoption is the result of a combination 
                                                        
13
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect”, 705. 
14
 Ibid. 
15 Rosa Brooks, Be careful what you wish for: Changing doctrines, changing technologies, and the 
lower cost of war, Proceedings of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International 
Law) 106, (March 2012), 33. 
16
 Ibid., 32. 
17
 Hassler, “R2P and the protection obligations of peacekeepers,” 206 
18
 Brooks, “Be careful what you wish for: Changing doctrines, changing technologies, and the 
lower cost of war”, 32. 
19
 Gareth Evans and Ramesh Thakur, Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to 
protect, International Security 37, no. 4 (Spring 2013), 202. 
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 of internal demands and external diffusion.”20 Norm diffusion comes in two 
forms: bottom-up or top-down vertical diffusion. Bottom-up vertical diffusion 
happens when an idea travels from one specific country to an international 
organization, such as the International Campaign to Ban Landmines Treaty, which 
originated from Jody Williams’ initiative to ban anti-personnel landmines and 
then took flight to spread to several international non-governmental organizations. 
On the contrary, RtoP is a case of top-down vertical diffusion, which “occurs 
when practices...move from international actors to national ones, for example, 
when international or regional tribunals encourage states that have not yet adopted 
a doctrine.”21 In this case, the doctrine was championed by the leader of the 
United Nations, who originally urged states to consider its adoption.  
International relations scholars Martha Finnemore and Sikkink have 
formulated a norm life cycle theory that is relevant in the analysis of the 
development of the RtoP doctrine. The cycle has three stages: norm emergence, 
norm cascade and norm internalization. The first stage involves a norm 
entrepreneur leading the effort to introduce and develop a new norm and 
attempting to pursuade other countries to endorse it.22 A successful example of a 
norm entrepreneur is Jody Williams in the aforementioned ICBL treaty example, 
which was born from her idea and now has more than 160 signatories. The norm 
entrepreneur in the case of RtoP was Secretary General Kofi Annan, who 
challenged the international community to “develop a way of reconciling the twin 
principles of sovereignty and protection of self-determination and fundamental 
human rights.”23 The second stage happens when several states adopt the norm. 
At this point, the cycle reaches a “tipping point”24, after which the cascade starts 
and the norm spreads to the remaining countries. 25 Since a significant number of 
governments have expressed support for RtoP, it should have reached the tipping 
point by now. However, it remains controversial especially in light of modern day 
implementation cases like Libya and Syria and therefore has not quite reached the 
norm cascade stage.26 At the last and third stage, a norm becomes internalized, 
meaning it is no longer contested, and compliance is almost a given.27 It is 
important to note that Sikkink and Finnemore assert that “the completion of the 
                                                        
20 Kathryn Sikkink, The justice cascade: how human rights prosecutions are changing world 
politics, (New York: W. W. Norton & Co., 2011), 247. 
21
 Ibid., 249-250. 
22
 Noha Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” Global 
Responsibility to Protect 3, no. 2 (June 2011), 175. 
23 Alex J. Bellamy, Realizing the responsibility to protect, International Studies Perspectives 10, 
no. 2 (2009), 111. 
24
 Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” 175. 
25
 Ibid., 175. 
26
 Ibid.,182. 
27
 Ibid.,175. 
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 norm life cycle is not a given, and not every evolving norm reaches the stage at 
which it becomes widely accepted.”28 RtoP’s completion of the cycle is still 
tentative due to the fact that it is still undergoing development.29 
Because complex norms can create confusion and allow for ambiguous 
interpretations, “simple and straightforward norms are more likely to develop into 
strong and effective norms and are more likely to generate compliance.”30 
Consequently, the Responsibility to Protect doctrine is having trouble achieving 
full compliance since multiple aspects of it remain unclear and leave room for 
susceptibility to manipulation and abuse. In order for a norm to properly evolve, it 
should provide clear and non-derogable terms that allow for predictability as well 
as consistency across all kinds of cases.31 One of the root problems of RtoP is that 
it does not yet have that level of clarity and specificity, given that each 
humanitarian crisis arises from different reasons and is analyzed on a case-by-
case basis. Additionally, to progress, a norm must be a logical fit amongst other 
existing norms.32 As aforementioned, the ‘responsibility to protect’ principle is 
fundamentally incongruent with the non-intervention UN policy that exists in the 
current realm of international law. The clash against the “higher principle”33 that 
is the UN Charter—accepted universally and recognized as international law— 
severely affects the development of the doctrine. Moreover, RtoP introduces “a 
vertical relationship between the intervening organization or state and the 
protected population, that does not in fact exist in law”34 yet. Another point that 
may invalidate RtoP as law is that it contains a “discretionary mandate.”35 
Because in its structure, the United Nations “systematically differentiates between 
its subjects in the application and enforcement of laws,” doubts arise about 
whether said discretion could ever be used wrongly and subsequently nullifies it 
as a legal system.36  
In contrast, RtoP also reflects “widely accepted norms and principles of 
international human rights law and the core principles of international 
humanitarian law pertaining to the protection of civilians caught in the midst of 
conflict,”37 in combination with the ideas established by several extant 
international treaties. This is a positive characteristic of the Responsibility to 
                                                        
28
 Ibid., 176. 
29
 Ibid. 
30
 Ibid 177. 
31
 Ibid. 
32
 Ibid.,178. 
33
 Ibid.,179. 
34
 Hassler, “R2P and the protection obligations of peacekeepers,” 201. 
35 Anne Orford, Rethinking the significance of the responsibility to protect concept, Proceedings 
of the Annual Meeting (American Society of International Law) 106, (March 2012), 28. 
36
  Ibid., 30. 
37
 Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” 191. 
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 Protect because ideas linked to higher principles are more likely to gain more 
support.38 For example, RtoP is designed to trigger international action to protect 
people from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing. 
These four specific crimes draw relevant parallels with widely recognized treaties 
such as the Genocide Convention, the Geneva Conventions, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which enjoy a notable high degree of 
global acceptance.  Furthermore, the core RtoP pillar that states should function 
for their people dates back to the teachings of the father of international law, 
Hugo Grotius, whose interpretation of law was based on the belief that the rules 
governing the actions of states should exist primarily for the benefit of the 
people.39 It similarly corresponds with the thoughts of contract theorist John 
Locke, who saw the relationship between the state and its citizens in terms of 
trust.40  
The United Nations Charter, recognized as legal doctrine as early as 1947, 
the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Law Commission 
(ILC), globally recognized law-making bodies, all include rules about the concept 
of erga omnes (towards all) obligations41 preceding the RtoP idea that state 
sovereignty entails duties on the international stage.42 The idea that states have 
the responsibility to protect their citizens is also present in the peacekeeping 
operations of the 1990s, dating back to former Secretary General’s Boutros 
Boutros Ghali’s Agenda for Peace which identified peacemaking as preventive 
diplomacy and post-conflict peacebuilding.43 This ideal greatly correlates with the 
three specific responsibilities of RtoP: the duties to prevent, react, and rebuild.44 
(ICISS report page XI) Moreover, at least in four of its five criteria, the legitimacy 
of military intervention as established by the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) and the High Level Panel correlates 
with jus bellum iustum, or just war theory, in upholding that states must resort to 
it only with “just cause, right intention, as a last resort, and with proportionality of 
means.”45 Evidently, these several examples show that RtoP is rooted in pre-
existing legal traditions and it is this connection that allowed the concept to gain 
some recognition in recent scenarios.46 Generally, an emerging doctrine’s 
                                                        
38
 Ibid., 179. 
39
 Carsten Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?” The 
American Journal of International Law 101, no. 1 (January 2007), 8. 
40
 Ibid. 
41
 Ibid., 9. 
42
 Ibid.,8. 
43
 Ibid.,9. 
44 International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), “The Responsibility 
to Protect,” XI. 
45
 Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?,” 10. 
46
 Ibid.  
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 capacity to garner support and encourage compliance is increased by its link and 
relationship to other norms that complement it.47  
Although it is true that RtoP coincides with the goals and purpose of other 
pre-established international norms48 it also undoubtedly carries a number of 
innovative principles. In fact, the ICISS admits that the doctrine demonstrates the 
progressive development of international law.49 RtoP suggests a collective duty to 
act in the face of gross human rights violations based on solidarity.50 The extant 
law of state responsibility also maintains this principle but only applies it to the 
“particular category of violations designated as serious breaches of a peremptory 
norm of general international law."51 Peremptory norms, also known as jus 
cogens, are principles of law that are so relevant that no nation may be exempted 
from them.52 Examples of such compelling laws include torture, slavery, genocide 
and piracy.53 RtoP attempts to take this a step further, asserting that the 
responsibility to cooperate also extends to states that may not have been affected 
by the other nations and expanding the scope of peremptory norms of 
international law to include war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity.54 Analyzing RtoP in the context of the Secretary General’s statements 
that it is meant to involve “adopting a ‘unifying perspective’ and facilitating 
‘system-wide coherence,’ and expanding and refocusing the UN’s ‘early warning 
and assessment capacities’”55 suggests that RtoP is heading towards norm-status, 
because it “confers powers ‘of a public or official nature’ and allocates 
jurisdiction.”56 However, the Responsibility to Protect should “be understood as 
normative” in the sense that it constitutes a set of “laws that confer powers” but 
not laws “that impose duties.”57 
 
A History of Evolution: Milestones since RtoP’s Birth  
 
The doctrine of the Responsibility to Protect had a rough start; in fact, it 
was almost entirely exterminated at its birth by being published in the aftermath 
                                                        
47
 Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” 178-179. 
48
 Ibid., 192. 
49
 Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?,” 10 
50
 Ibid. 
51
 Ibid. 
52
 Thomas G. Weiss, Researching humanitarian intervention: Some lessons, Journal of Peace 
Research 38, no. 4 (July 2001), 112. 
53 Ibid. 
54
 Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?,” 10. 
55
 Orford, “Rethinking the significance of the responsibility to protect concept,” 29. 
56
 Ibid., 30. 
57
 Ibid. 
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 of the terrorist attacks of September 11.58 Former UN Secretary General Kofi 
Annan first proposed it, believing that gross violations of human rights should no 
longer be considered as solely national matters and that they should not be 
tolerated.59 Within two years of the norm’s creation in 2001, international lawyers 
and scholars began to embrace it as well, making the emerging doctrine more 
public.60 RtoP made its first official appearance in the Canadian International 
Commission on the Intervention and State Sovereignty Report, which was a 
response to Annan’s “acknowledgement of the international need to develop a 
new response to massive intra-state human rights violations.”61 The final report of 
the ICISS, issued on December 2001, outlined the novel idea of the responsibility 
to protect in detail.  
The ICISS made four significant contributions to reduce the gap between 
the legality and legitimacy of intervention.62 First, the report established a shift in 
the language of intervention from ‘the right to intervene’ to ‘the responsibility to 
protect.’ This change was crucial in reducing the tensions about the debate63 
especially in relation to the hostility on behalf of developing countries that 
“remain deeply suspicious of the self-serving hidden agenda of geopolitical and 
commercial interests behind such claims.”64 Secondly, it established a new way of 
talking about sovereignty by emphasizing its limits and switching the focus to 
security and human rights issues.65 The ICISS accomplished this by outlining that 
sovereignty is embedded with a primary responsibility of the state to protect its 
people, and secondary responsibility of the international community. Third, the 
ICISS made great strides in communicating that RtoP is not solely about military 
intervention by pointing out the doctrine’s relevant attempts at prevention, 
reaction, and rebuilding. According to the drafters of the ICISS report, the 
responsibility to prevent was the most important because it eradicated the problem 
of intervention before it could even present itself.66 Lastly, the report provided 
rules for acceptable military intervention, based on the guidelines of the just war 
theory of international law. On this point, the ICISS “managed to gather broad 
support because it avoided taking a final stance on the question of the legality of 
                                                        
58
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” 712. 
59
 Barry E. Carter and Allen S. Weiner, International Law, Sixth Edition, New York: Wolters 
Kluwer Law and Business, 2006, 1007. 
60
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” 712. 
61
 Berman and Michaelsen, “Intervention in Libya: Another nail in the coffin for the 
responsibility-to-protect?,” 339-340 
62
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” 707. 
63
 Ibid., 708. 
64
 Evans and Thakur, “Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect,” 202. 
65
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” 707. 
66
 Ibid. 
8
Global Tides, Vol. 9 [2015], Art. 9
http://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/globaltides/vol9/iss1/9
 unauthorized interventions.”67 As established by the ICISS, the RtoP doctrine was 
not a legal principle but “merely a policy option” based on existing international 
foundations to support the argument that a legal norm of intervention in response 
to massive human rights violations was emerging.68 However, it is important to 
note that RtoP, from its beginnings, contained “the normative and structural 
building blocks necessary to give it the potential to develop into an independent 
legal norm in the future.”69  
 The second landmark moment for the RtoP doctrine came three years after 
the ICISS Report. In the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change Report titled A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, the UN 
High-level Commission utilized RtoP as a benchmark for judging the Sudanese 
government’s actions in Darfur.70 This instance marked the first time that a UN 
commissioned report had applied the RtoP principle and found that a state had 
“manifestly failed to protect its citizens.”71 The High-level Panel document 
outlined the doctrine in the context of Chapter VII of the UN Charter and 
emphasized every state’s duty to protect people from suffering from preventable 
tragedies.72 However, the question of which state should assume said 
responsibility was left unanswered, since ‘every state’ could be interpreted as “a 
simple reminder of the erga omnes nature of the international obligations” or as a 
“shift from the host state to every other state in cases where the former is unable 
or unwilling to act.”73 The latter interpretation would greatly expand the pre-
existing framework of the law of state responsibility by establishing a multi-
dimensional system of responsibility.74 The High-level Panel considered RtoP an 
emerging norm, which is misleading in that it is “over-optimistic and over-
pessimistic at the same time” since the doctrine is “so innovative that it may be 
premature to speak of a crystallizing practice.”75 
One year later, the 2005 United Nations World Summit was held, where 
more than 150 heads of state, identified with the RtoP concept and showed their 
support for a more restricted concept of the ‘responsibility to protect.’76 As a 
response, the World Summit Outcome Document, known as WSOD, offered a 
                                                        
67
 Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?,” 3. 
68
 Berman and Michaelsen, “Intervention in Libya: Another nail in the coffin for the 
responsibility-to-protect?,” 342. 
69
 Ibid. 
70
 Bellamy, “Realizing the responsibility to protect,” 116. 
71
 Ibid. 
72
 Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?,” 5. 
73
 Ibid. 
74
 Ibid. 
75
 Ibid., 8. 
76 Tiewa, “China and responsibility to protect: Maintenance and change of its policy for 
intervention,” 153. 
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 more constricted version of the ICISS formulation.77 Some RtoP advocates, such 
as Evans, felt that in the WSOD, the main values of the ICISS formulation 
“survived almost unscathed” and even saw these changes as a positive step in the 
right direction.78 For them, the World Summit, with its large international 
audience, represented the tipping point of the norm life cycle.79 Other experts, 
such as Carsten Stahn and Edward Luck, believed that the document 
demonstrated the overall confusion about the meaning of the concept and even 
dared to nickname it ‘RtoP lite.’80 They believed that this watered-down version 
was actually a shift away from the ICISS document that “affirmed a restrained 
notion of responsibility largely devoid of normative value.”81  
The many differing interpretations of RtoP were exposed at the World 
Summit. Several states saw it as too vague and vulnerable to manipulation while 
others saw it as “incompatible with the Charter, noting that there is no shared 
responsibility in international law outside the responsibility of a state to protect its 
own citizens.”82 Moreover, the US unilaterally refused to accept that either the 
United Nations as a whole, or the Security Council, or individual states, have an 
obligation to intervene under international law and instead proposed to frame the 
doctrine of RtoP as a “moral responsibility.” 83 The Outcome Document was 
produced as an attempt to balance all the interpretations without downgrading the 
doctrine to a merely moral concept but also assuming “a more reserved stance vis-
a-vis responsibility to take collective action through the Security Council under 
Chapter VII.”84 For example, the language used in paragraphs 138 and 139 
alluded to a voluntary, rather than a mandatory, intervention.85 It is relevant to 
note that the WSOD included a section that asked the General Assembly to bear 
in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. This fact proposes that 
even those who drafted the Outcome Document had some doubts whether their 
own proposal was consistent with international law and the Charter.86  
On April 2006, the Security Council made its very first explicit reference 
to RtoP in its language through the unanimous adoption of Resolution 1674. 
Through this Resolution concerning the Protection of Civilians in Armed 
Conflict, the Council confirmed the provisions of paragraphs 138 and 139 of the 
                                                        
77
 Evans and Thakur, “Humanitarian intervention and the responsibility to protect,” 201. 
78
 Hassler, “R2P and the protection obligations of peacekeepers,” 207. 
79
 Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” 182. 
80
 Hassler, “R2P and the protection obligations of peacekeepers,” 207. 
81
 Berman and Michaelsen, “Intervention in Libya: Another nail in the coffin for the 
responsibility-to-protect?,” 345. 
82
 Stahn, “Responsibility to protect: Political rhetoric or emerging legal norm?,” 6. 
83
 Ibid. 
84
 Ibid., 7. 
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 Ibid., 6. 
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 Ibid. 
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 2005 World Summit Outcome Document regarding the responsibility to protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against 
humanity87 and expressed its willingness to take the necessary steps.88  In the 
same month, paragraphs 138 and 139 of the WSOD were also referred to in 
Resolution 1706 concerning the endorsement by high-ranking representatives of 
almost all countries in the international community which increased the doctrine’s 
legitimacy.89 As Evans put it, getting such language endorsed unanimously by 
many international actors was a significant achievement.90 Additionally, the 
specific references to the doctrine in the UN resolutions mentioned above further 
increased its legitimacy, especially in the case of Resolution 1674, which 
“endorse[d] RtoP as well as the Hague and Geneva Conventions, key instruments 
of international humanitarian law, in calling for a broad range of protections for 
civilians”91 and “emphasise[d] its breadth and non-coercive aspects and [made] it 
compatible with other norms.”92 A more recent attempt to advance the norm is 
portrayed in the Roundtable Talks led by the Global Centre for the Responsibility 
to Protect (GCR2P), as part of the Responsibility to Protect-Engaging Civil 
Society (R2PCS) project in 2008.93 The project consisted of roundtable talks held 
in several countries aimed at  
“bring[ing] together NGOs from all regions of the world to strengthen 
normative consensus for RtoP, further the understanding of the norm, push 
for strengthened capacities to prevent and halt genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and mobilise NGOs to push 
for action to save lives in RtoP country-specific situations.”94  
 
It is relevant to consider, however, that neither mention actually elaborated on the 
norm, or further interpreted RtoP or applied it to specific cases.95 Therefore, 
although these mentions are significant, they are not of tangible value to the legal 
advancement of the RtoP doctrine.96  
 
RtoP in Libya 
                                                        
87 United Nations Security Council, 5430th Meeting, Resolution 1674 (S/RES/1674), 28 April 
2006, 4. 
88
 Ibid., 5. 
89
 Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” 188. 
90
 Evans, “From Humanitarian Intervention to the Responsibility to Protect,” 715. 
91
 Shawki, “Responsibility to Protect: The Evolution of an International Norm,” 188. 
92
 Ibid., 189. 
93
 Ibid., 182. 
94
 Ibid., 183. 
95
 Ibid., 188. 
96
 Ibid. 
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 The humanitarian crises that took place in Libya and Syria in 2011 
represent two instances in which the ‘responsibility to protect’ should have been 
proven to be “a force for good.”97 Unfortunately, the opposite happened, posing a 
serious hindrance to the evolution of the emerging doctrine. Consequently, it is 
relevant to analyze the Libyan and Syrian crises as evaluations that show that 
RtoP is still in its early stages.”98 For instance, ICISS co-chair Gareth Evans 
regarded the Libyan intervention as “a textbook case of the RtoP norm working 
exactly as it was supposed to, with nothing else in issue but stopping continuing 
and imminent mass atrocity crimes.”99 In 2011, the Security Council referenced 
RtoP in Resolution 1973, which authorized the use of force to protect civilians in 
Libya. Initially, the Resolution restated the responsibility of the Libyan authorities 
to protect the Libyan population and authorized the use of force to protect 
civilians under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya” while explicitly 
rejecting “foreign occupation force of any form on any part of Libyan 
territory.”100 President Barack Obama expressed that the intervening parties 
would not “use force to go beyond a well-defined goal – specifically, the 
protection of civilians in Libya.”101 The situation became more complex when, a 
few days later, he contradicted himself by stating that while the military goal was 
to save lives, the world would “continue to pursue the broader goal of a Libya that 
belongs not to a dictator, but to its people.”102 For this fact alone, it is not 
surprising that many RtoP scholars are unsure if the NATO-led operation in Libya 
remained a “textbook RtoP case for its duration.”103 In essence, Resolution 1973 
in Libya was supposed to prove that RtoP was a useful instrument in the 
regulation of humanitarian intervention. Unfortunately, the doctrine lost much of 
its hard-earned credibility from the international community and suffered 
adversely when the principle was used to justify NATO deployment.104  
When the Syrian crisis began soon after, it was assumed that, since the 
concept of the responsibility to protect had been used to authorize intervention in 
Libya a short time prior, intervention on humanitarian grounds would also be 
authorized in this instance. The assumption was erroneous since, the misuse of 
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 RtoP in Libya negatively influenced Russian and Chinese perspectives on it, 
being countries that strongly oppose international intervention.105 By ousting 
Muammar Qaddafi and overstepping the mandate, NATO broke down the trust of 
two Security Council members who, in turn, exercised their veto and created a 
blockade for action in Syria. Former Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, 
immediately affirmed that Russia would “block any similarly-worded Security 
Council resolution on Syria” compelled by his firm belief “that a good resolution 
ha[d] been turned into a piece of paper” and then used to justify a meaningless 
military operation.106 South African officials were also alarmed that the resolution 
was “part of a hidden agenda aimed at once again instituting regime change.”107 
After analyzing the blatant abuse of the doctrine in Libya, it becomes less difficult 
to understand why many governments around the world continue to see RtoP as a 
“Trojan horse that provides a humanitarian alibi for powerful…western states…to 
pursue their national policy and [advance] their economic and strategic 
interests.”108 It is impossible to quantitatively assess the costs that the abusive 
intervention in Libya has imposed on the doctrine’s progress towards norm status. 
However, the international community’s paralysis in face of the Syrian crisis 
shows that RtoP consensus has been severely “damaged by gaps in expectation, 
communication, and accountability between those who mandated the [Libyan] 
operation and those who executed it.”109  
 
Criticisms and Weaknesses  
 
Even prior to the Libyan crisis it had been widely suggested that the RtoP 
doctrine is a “double edged-sword, susceptible to abuse.”110 Looking outside of the 
Libyan context, many opposing nations fear that it gives way to potential abuse by 
states who might use RtoP arguments to justify unilateral self-interest actions.111 
For example, the representative of Egypt to the United Nations stated his nation’s,  
“concerns about the possible abuse of RtoP by expanding its application to 
situations that fall beyond the four areas defined in the 2005 World 
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 Summit Outcome, and by misusing it to legitimize unilateral coercive 
measures or intervention in the internal affairs of States.”112  
 
To complicate matters, some of the countries that condemn RtoP for being 
misapplied also abuse it themselves. For example, Russia has claimed on several 
occasions to believe RtoP’s interventionist “practices to be illegitimate and 
dangerous and apt to lead to a realignment of the entire United Nations system” 
and the “council’s application…of enforcement measures under Chapter VII of 
the United Nations Charter [to be] unjustified and excessive.”113 In this context, it 
is interesting to note that despite its open opposition, Russia referred to RtoP 
principles in its justification of unilateral armed intervention in the 2008 Georgia 
events.114 By distorting it in this way, Russia is weakening the ‘responsibility to 
protect’ concept and further pointing out that it will require more than a few 
adjustments to ever transform into a legal principle. 
Another strong critic of the responsibility to protect is China. Although 
open to discuss application of RtoP, China asserts that “RtoP cannot be used to 
place pressure on states because it remains merely a concept and lacks the force of 
international law.115 Since human rights are of lesser importance than sovereignty 
to Chinese officials who feel that, “external interference weakens the independent 
sovereignty and further deteriorates the human rights situation,”116 it is unlikely 
that the Chinese government will ever completely fully embrace RtoP practices. 
However, by signing on to the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and 
Change, supporting the Outcome Document at the World Summit in 2005, and 
not using its veto power on interventionist measures in Libya, it is evident that 
China’s attitude towards humanitarian intervention has shifted from absolute non-
intervention to conditional interference intervention. On this note, it is relevant 
that China showed support for the WSOD but not the original formulation of RtoP 
in ICISS report, which attempted to bypass the Security Council authorization.117 
Clearly, China desires its veto power to remain intact, further emphasizing its 
conditional support. China’s minor, yet significant, change of attitude towards 
greater support for human rights protection and intervention under the UN 
framework gives hope that perhaps, over time, other states could also make such a 
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 shift, advancing the development of the RtoP concept.118 However, in the current 
global stage, such a sentiment is not enough to propel RtoP forward.119 
In addition to the suspicion of RtoP being “neo-imperial in motive,”120 the 
doctrine’s tolerance of unilateral intervention undermines several principles of the 
UN Charter, “particularly those related to the use of force, sovereignty, territorial 
integrity and non interference in the internal affairs of states.”121 As previously 
stated, this conflict with pre-existing widely accepted international law is one of 
RtoP’s major weaknesses. Another of its flaws is its close, albeit erroneous, 
association with humanitarian intervention, which leads “some prominent figures 
to misrepresent R2P as a way of ‘legalizing’ humanitarian intervention.”122 The 
overwhelming focus that has been placed on the military intervention aspect of 
RtoP as opposed to its other core concepts of prevention and rebuilding has 
hindered consensus and compliance to this evolving norm.123 In his 2009 Report 
on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, the Secretary General “removed 
the [RtoP] concept from the section about use of force and moved [it] to a section 
that dealt with the freedom to live in dignity.”124 Despite his attempts to 
disassociate the doctrine from armed intervention, he did not manage to make 
intervention on humanitarian grounds more appealing.125 Finally, RtoP’s last and 
possibly most notable weakness is that it is subject to Security Council 
authorization. The Security Council can “expressly reject a proposal for 
intervention where humanitarian or human rights issues are significantly at 
stake,”126 making it difficult to argue that the norm has the power to evolve on its 
own, without full P5 support. Due to this, RtoP can be considered “hostage to the 
political and moral corruption of the permanent members of the UNSC.”127   
 
Moving Forward: Proposals for Progress 
 
In order for the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine to have any chance at 
prospering in the future, it is important to recognize its flaws and past mistakes 
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 and attempt to make positive adjustments to it. One current, post-Libya proposal 
to consider for the improvement of RtoP is the idea of ‘Responsibility While 
Protecting’, or RWP. Brazil, one of the most outspoken critics of the abuse of the 
doctrine in Libya, has proposed RWP as a supplement, not a substitute, of RtoP.128 
RWP calls on the Security Council to “embrace, formally or informally, an agreed 
set of criteria or guidelines to help it reach consensus in any debate before an 
RtoP military intervention is authorized” as well as for the Council to set up some 
sort of enforcement mechanism to ensure that RtoP–based missions remain 
focused on the protection of citizens from start to finish.129 Once again, RWP 
“draws attention to the propensity of coercive RtoP interventions to generate 
regime change in their target states.”130  
A different proposal that has not received much support is the idea of 
enacting the “Responsibility Not To Veto”, or RN2V.131 This idea proposes that 
the permanent five members of the UN Security Council could come to an 
agreement to refrain from using their veto power to block action in response to 
genocide and mass atrocities which would otherwise could pass by a majority 
vote.132 The main problem with this proposal is that the P5 (especially Russia and 
China) are not likely to want to give up the power of their veto.133 Although 
improbable, a restriction on veto power is needed in order to prevent that “the 
interests of very few dictate the fates of many.”134  
Another way to boost the development of the ‘responsibility to protect’ 
further is to place greater emphasis on the responsibility to prevent. In this way, 
military intervention, the deepest root of disagreement in RtoP debates, will be 
presented less often. Since its creation, the ICISS outlined the responsibility to 
prevent as the most important quality135 of RtoP, and yet this aspect of the 
doctrine remains obscure. As Evans claims, prevention is a crucial constituent of 
the RtoP doctrine.136 In fact, the ICISS report contains an entire chapter that deals 
with the ‘responsibility to prevent’ in which it sets out a three-step framework for 
the prevention of conflict: 1) early warning systems 2) preventive toolbox 3) 
political will. Some NGOs have played a crucial part in promoting this aspect of 
the doctrine, “particularly in the context of early warning efforts and helping to 
galvanize domestic and foreign public opinion in support of prevention 
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 measures.”137 Prevention is also emphasized in the WSOD of 2005, along with 
the need to prioritize peaceful reactions to mass violence.138 Efforts to shift the 
focus from intervention to prevention have been a priority of the UN and the 
international community for many years.139 This correlation between RtoP’s 
purpose and the historic attempts to prevent rather than react gives a hopeful 
glimpse of potential for progress. 
One last improvement that could positively impact RtoP’s journey towards 
norm status would be to increase the specificity of the doctrine. There are 
currently a lot of misunderstandings as to how the norm should be used and 
“divergent expectations about when and under what circumstances the norm 
should be invoked.”140 Even in instances when the international community 
agrees on the pressing need for humanitarian action, the doctrine of RtoP does not 
automatically specify who the responsibility should fall on.141 Stipulating the 
‘who, when, and how’ of the doctrine more clearly has the potential of preventing 
the abuse of those who implement the doctrine to “support their views” in 
convenient instances, or to justify “politically motivated interventions” in 
others.142  
 
Conclusion 
 
After analyzing the path of the ‘responsibility to protect’ doctrine from its 
creation in 2001 to its present cases of implementation in 2011, it is clear that 
RtoP has reached a crossroads in its goal of staying pertinent and valuable.143 
Despite the remarkably fast-paced rise of the concept, none of RtoP’s four 
milestone moments (the ICISS 2001 report, the 2004 High-level Panel on Threats, 
Challenges and Change report the 2005 World Summit Outcome Document, or 
the 2008 GCR2P roundtable talks) can be interpreted as forming binding 
international law under the classic sources of international law.144 As suggested 
by the Panel, an emerging norm like RtoP is only “valuable if individual Member 
States, whether or not they are members of the Security Council, subscribe to 
them” and unfortunately, this is not yet the case.145 For example, the UN 
representative of Pakistan noted that there is pre-existing humanitarian law 
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 addressing this issue and asserted that it was “not the absence of an interventionist 
doctrine” that led to the humanitarian catastrophes of the 1990s.146 Similarly, the 
Russian envoy has boldly stated that “the establishment of an international norm 
presupposes that there is wide support within the international community for 
such a norm. However, that is not the case here.”147 As Sikkink explains, “norms 
have power in, and because of, what people do.”148 Therefore, without 
widespread acceptance and practice of the responsibility to protect, the GA-
endorsed concept could fade away due to its “lack of structural characteristics 
necessary to facilitate its development into a normative principle of international 
law.”149 Ultimately, the success of RtoP depends on the desires of major world 
powers and on the more morally grounded humanitarian-based implementation 
for the protection of citizens rather than political self-interest.150 Consequently, 
“any claim that [it] is an emergent customary rule runs up against the fact that 
several major states have fundamentally contested [its] legality.”151  
It is true that RtoP has the potential to “gradually replace humanitarian 
intervention in the course of the twenty-first century.”152 However, further 
adjustments, compromises, a narrower interpretation, clearer definitions, 
expectations, and greater support by international actors will be necessary for it to 
advance into an organizing principle of international society.153 In the meantime, 
it lacks sufficient backing to become enforceable international law and 
subsequently, thirteen years after its birth, remains “in many ways still a political 
catchword rather than a legal norm.”154  
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